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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on the leadership roles of Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias “Prachanda,” in 
the Maoist’s political victory in Nepal. The Nepalese Maoist Insurgency under 
Prachanda’s leadership, without strong evident external support and without achieving a 
military victory over the state, rose to power in a very short time. Prachanda chose an 
outdated ideology and launched armed struggle to put forward his grievances in spite of 
the country having restored democracy after thirty years of autocratic regime. 
The evidence shows that it was Prachanda’s leadership qualities that facilitated 
the Maoists’ growth in Nepal. They gained political success without military victory and 
eventually won an electoral victory in the Constituent Assembly. The main reasons for his 
success in this endeavor, which the findings show, are: 1) correct selection of the 
members in the party’s top leadership positions; 2) thorough planning and timely 
implementation of a precise strategy; 3) the flexibility to switch his strategy from classic 
communist ideology of class struggle to identity issues, to form many ethnic fronts, to 
establish autonomous ethnic regions, and to raise caste and ethnic issues to mobilize the 
indigenous nationalities; and 4) timely switching to political settlements, in the present-
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I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, known mostly by his alias “Prachanda” since the beginning 
of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, has been in the forefront of Nepali politics for much 
of the last 15 years. However, his ascension to power appears to have been expedited 
since the Maoists laid down their weapons and came into the mainstream politics after 
successful negotiations that took place in various stages during 2006. 
Although Prachanda’s very existence was often questioned throughout the 
insurgency, he nevertheless became the Prime Minister of Nepal in 2008 after Maoists 
secured the majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly elections. Unlike many nations 
of the world where insurgencies lead to massive blood baths before incumbents are 
toppled and rebels come to power, Nepalese Maoists rose to power with relatively less 
violence, giving up arms for negotiated settlements. This event led the Maoists to accept 
democratic means to settle the internal problems of the country.  
There are many reasons to explain how insurgencies begin and how they end and 
whether they succeed or fail. In this thesis, I particularly look into the leadership of 
Prachanda, who is the chairman of the Unified Communist Party (Maoist)—UCPN 
(Maoist)—in the context of his successes and failures in his path to power. What made 
his party rise to power without militarily defeating the state? 
Prachanda shrewdly but carefully balanced the “inside” and “outside” political 
games. He maneuvered through government oppositions and constraints. In 2005, 
realizing that the military victory over the state was unlikely, he decide to enter into a 
political settlement with major political parties and subsequently outmaneuvered them, 




In the era when communist powers of the world, such as the former USSR, had 
collapsed and China continued to reform politically and economically to stay globally 
competitive, Prachanda and his party members were promoting an outdated ideology and 
practices in the remote Kingdom of Nepal to supposedly serve the illiterate and 
economically and socially destitute population. 
While democracy is believed to be an appropriate system to address people’s 
grievances and resolve conflicts by negotiation and compromises, Prachanda still chose 
an outdated ideology and launched an armed struggle to put forward his grievances in 
spite of the country’s restoring democracy after thirty years of autocratic regime (Thapa, 
2005). 
C. HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN NEPAL 
The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was founded in Calcutta, India, in 1949. 
Since its inception, it has experienced many ups and downs, personality clashes, splits, 
reunions, and mergers. At present the mainstream left is represented by the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Unified Marxists-Leninists)—CPN (UML). At the same time, there are 
nearly half a dozen other communist political parties that take part in the active politics of 
Nepal. Outside this grouping stands the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)—CPN 
(Maoist)—with an ideological stance that is farthest left (Thapa, 2005). 
In Nepal, the communist parties have a long-standing history of splitting when 
and if some ideological differences or opportunities arise. Since the establishment of the 
Communist Party of Nepal in 1949, there have been more than a dozen splits in the party 
(Thapa, 2005). Disregarding their historical trends of splitting, Prachanda chose to 
overlook the costs of a party split and went ahead with his agenda based on communist 
ideology. 
 3
D. MAOIST IDEOLOGY AND PRACHANDA PATH (THE PRACHANDA’S 
LINE) 
The Maoist insurgency was initially based on Mao’s three-stage strategy for 
winning a “People’s War”—strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic offence 
(Lawati, 2010). However, Prachanda was flexible and tactful enough to formulate new 
strategies to grab the opportunities that appeared along the line of struggle. 
When he realized that the rural mobilization was not sufficient to pressure the 
centre, he revised the strategy and complemented it with urban mobilization, subsuming 
the dual rural- urban mobilization strategy within the Prachanda Path, or the Prachanda 
Line. Initially the movement was a class-based struggle, but Prachanda later recognized 
the salience of identity issues in Nepal and raised these issues. This mobilization of 
ethnic groups produced rich rewards for the movement (Lawati, 2010). 
In this manner, Prachanda switched his strategy from the classic communist 
ideology of class struggle to identity issues, formed many ethnic fronts, established 
autonomous ethnic regions, and raised caste and ethnic issues to mobilize the indigenous 
nationalities. Prachanda was able to make his party grow strong enough to disrupt social, 
political, and economic life as well as strong enough to bring political and economic 
processes at the national level to a near standstill (Lawati, 2010). Concluding that the 
military victory over the state is not only difficult but also time-consuming, Prachanda 
decided to forge a deal with political parties to end the armed struggle and enter into 
mainstream politics (Roy, 2008). 
After entering into a comprehensive peace agreement, the Maoists were able to 
oust the 240-year-old Monarchy and convert the only Hindu kingdom in the world into a 
secular state. Furthermore, they secured an impressive victory in the Constituent 
Assembly election and formed a government (Lawati, 2010). They ruled the country for 
nearly a year. As a part of the exploration, this paper will investigate the “inside game” 
and “outside game” of Prachanda’s leadership successes and failures and explain how he 
maneuvered through oppositions and constraints to enter into political settlement with 
major political parties in Nepal. The thesis will also explore how he outmaneuvered even 
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the other political parties to lead his party to become the largest party in the constituent 
assembly elections and facilitate his rise to power. 
E. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
“Most internal wars end on the battlefield. Only a small percentage end at the 
negotiating table” (McCormick, 2005, p.321). The Maoist insurgency in Nepal is one 
among that small percentage which ended at the negotiating table. The purpose of this 
thesis is to study Prachanda’s “inside game” and “outside game” and to analyze how he 
maneuvered through oppositions and constraints to enter into a political settlement with 
the major political parties in Nepal and subsequently how he outmaneuvered them to turn 
his party into the largest political party in the Constituent Assembly elections. 
The scope of this study is to evaluate Prachanda’s leadership qualities and analyze 
his adaptive strategic vision, particularly by illustrating some events that strengthened the 
party to form the government as well as some events that brought the party to the brink of 
a split. The events that will be illustrated are: 1) the evolution of the Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal; 2) the Chunbang Plenum, which decided to give up the politics of arms for 
political settlement; 3) the Kharipati Plenum, which managed to unite the political 
differences within the party; 4) negotiations that strengthened the Maoist organization; 
and 5) the sacking of the Army chief that led to Prachanda’s resignation as Prime 
Minister. 
F. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Collapses of communist powers of the world, such as the former USSR, and the 
Chinese adoption of political and economic reforms to stay globally competitive indicate 
the failure of communist ideology worldwide. Moreover, Nepal already was a democracy 
and GDP growth was in a positive direction (Lawati, 2010). In these political and 
economic conditions, it is difficult for insurgencies to grow even to a recognizable size. 
However, the Nepalese Maoists under Prachanda’s leadership, without external support 
and without achieving a military victory over the state, rose to power in a very short time. 
Was it Prachanda’s ability as a political entrepreneur to balance the “inside game” and 
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“outside game” to maneuver through oppositions and constraints that facilitated his party 
rise of his party to power through the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal? 
Furthermore, the thesis will try to answer: Who is Pushpa Kamal Dahal, or 
“Prachanda”? What was his vision and how has he executed his vision over the last 16 
years? In addition, the thesis will try to understand the Maoists’ present position in 
national and international politics as well as also look into the future of Prachanda and his 
party. 
The Maoists in Nepal, led by Prachanda, launched their communist-based 
insurgency at a time when politically Nepal had been transformed from a one-party 
autocratic monarchy to a multiparty democracy with a constitutional monarchy. The 
country’s economy was witnessing a positive growth, as indicated by the growth in GDP, 
due to the introduction of many liberal policies (Lawati, 2010). Furthermore, the 
communist regimes around the world either had collapsed or were on the path of 
collapsing. Yet the Maoists in Nepal managed in just 12 years to rise as a viable political 
power in the country and obtained a leadership role in the government. In order to explain 
this transformation, one would have to examine the leadership abilities of Prachanda, 
how he countered the state oppositions and constraints and maneuvered to ascend to 
power, and the pivotal role he played in uniting and organizing the Maoist party towards 
political victory. 
Hypothesis: Prachanda’s abilities to maneuver through oppositions and 
constraints led the CPN (Maoist) to power through instigating the insurgency, but without 
achieving military victory over the state. 
G. LITERATURE REVIEW: OVERVIEW OF PAST RESEARCH 
The available literature on the Maoist movement in Nepal focuses primarily on 
the causes of insurgency, the growth of it, and failures of the government policy to 
counter the insurgency. The literature focuses on comprehensive peace agreements 
between the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance that led to peaceful settlement; 
furthermore, it discusses the way the Maoists achieved their political victory as an 
organization in a Constituent Assembly election. 
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Moreover, the available literature on the Maoist rise to power mainly focuses on 
1) the causes of Maoist insurgency, 2) the communist ideology, 3) the counter-state 
strategy, 4) structural and organizational growth of the Maoists, and 5) the weaknesses of 
government. 
Mahendra Lawati and Anup K. Pahari (2010) put emphasis on poverty, economic 
inequality, socio-cultural inequality, and social change and fluidity as causes of the 
evolution and growth of the Maoist movement in Nepal. They further argue that these 
causes are only a conducive environment for the insurgency; unless a committed group 
exploits favorable conditions to build an organization and engage in mobilization, a 
rebellion may not occur. They have emphasized the ideological and organizational side of 
the insurgency. 
Ali Riaz and Subho Basu (2007) illustrate the causes and conditions of Maoist 
conflict in Nepal. They blame state failure for the weak “performance legitimacy” of the 
government. They further analyze the roles of ethnicity, identity, and deprivation in 
engendering discontent, and the rise of the Maoists as a formidable political force. 
Hutt (2004) examines how historical political contexts led to Maoist growth in 
Nepal. He concludes that the Maoist movement, having similarities to Peru’s Shining 
Path, has grown at an extraordinary speed and that the Maoists controlled most of the 
rural areas of the country due to the government’s shortcomings in the post-1990 
democratic system of governance. He also emphasizes the social, the economic, and the 
political deprivation of people that led to Maoist growth in the country. However, there 
are very few arguments put forward to argue whether the Maoist leadership, especially 
Prachanda’s, had any role in their success. 
A 2005 International Crisis Group Report, N 104-27, focuses mainly on Maoist 
aims, structure, and strategy. The paper concludes by arguing that the Maoists, whether 
by force of arms or force of ideas or a combination of both, have emerged as a formidable 
political organization.  
Lawati (2010) comments on the Maoist strategy to counter the state—how the 
Maoists indoctrinated their cadres and how they initiated ethnic and caste issues to boost 
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their movement. By doing this, they grew spectacularly in size and spread geographically 
in different areas. He also argues that the weak democratic government and its failure to 
recognize the insurgency at the earlier stage were the reasons for their success. 
International Crisis Group Report (2005) argues that Prachanda has a tight grip on 
the party and writs are sent by him down the line to districts on a timely basis. The paper 
also argues that there are minor leadership conflicts within the party. However, there is 
not much written on Prachanda to investigate the particular role he played as a leader of 
the Maoist movement in Nepal. 
The literature lacks a comprehensive study on the leadership events that caused 
the insurgency to grow in Nepal. The present literature lacks research on Prachanda’s role 
in the overall Maoist movement. There is very little investigation done on the part of 
Maoist leadership, especially Prachanda’s. It lacks the answers to the questions such as: 
How did he visualize the structural condition of the country and assess the human terrain 
that would support his movement? How did he manage to formulate the strategies that 
would counter the state and let the insurgency grow in size? How did he motivate the 
cadres under his leadership and build organizations that willingly would implement his 
strategy? Finally, what made him give up arms to settle for peace so that he could secure 
political victory in the constitutional assembly election and become the Prime Minister of 
the country? 
In this thesis, I particularly try to focus on explaining Prachanda’s ability as a 
leader, how he balanced the “inside game” and “outside game” to counter the 
government’s opposition and maneuver the party to power. 
H. METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis, I will adopt a historical process-tracing method. This study will 
include both primary and secondary sources of information. I will investigate 
Prachanda’s leadership effectiveness during the Maoist insurgency as well as while in 
power as the Prime Minister of the country. While it is possible to get data to show a 
change in the dependent variable (the Maoists’ rise to power), the measurement of the 
independent variable (leadership ability) will logically be qualitative. 
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To analyze Prachanda’s leadership, I will illustrate four major events from the 
beginning of the insurgency to their electoral victory in the constituent assembly 
elections. In particular, his vision and strategy that led the Maoist insurgency in Nepal to 
power will be analyzed. In particular, the following events will be investigated: 
1. His role in Chunbang Plenum (where he decided to join mainstream 
politics by giving up arms).  
2. His role in Kharipati Plenum. The rumors about the ideological 
differences among the hard-cores and the moderates within the party were 
leading into a greater conflict. The party was heading towards a split. I 
will investigate how he managed to address the political differences and 
saved the party from the split. 
3. Prachanda’s role during negotiations, which always placed Maoists in 
advantageous positions. 
4. His decision to sack the Army chief. The Maoists’ unilateral decision to 
sack the Chief of the Army Staff, who was retiring after three months, and 
the appointment of a new chief generated a new conflicting environment 
within the ruling coalition. This decision was overruled by the president, 
which forced Prachanda to resign from the government. 
To understand his vision and strategy, I will first outline the socio-political 
structure of the country from which Prachanda launched the armed struggle to challenge 
the democratically established government. I will attempt, based on his vision and 
strategy, to explain how Prachanda organized his party into political, military, and 
popular fronts to rise to power. 
By illustrating the above-mentioned events, I will try to evaluate his successes by 
looking into the decisions that strengthened the organization’s unity along the line of 
growth, and evaluate his failures by looking at those decisions that weakened the 
organizational strength and generated inter-party conflicts.  
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEPAL 
(MAOIST) 
A. HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN NEPAL 
The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was founded in Calcutta, India, in 1949. 
Since its beginning, it has experienced many ups and downs; personality clashes, splits, 
reunions, and mergers. At present the mainstream left is represented by the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Unified Marxists-Leninists)—UCPN (UML). At the same time, there are 
nearly half a dozen other communist political parties that take part in the active politics of 
Nepal. Outside this grouping stands the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN 
(Maoist), with an ideological stance that is furthest left (Thapa, 2004). 
The main root of the present Maoist party can be traced back to 1974, when the 
Maoists had sought to form a viable political party based on sustainable unity. Under the 
leadership of Mohan Bikram Singh and Nirmal Lama, Maoists formed a party called the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Fourth Convention or Fourth Congress) (Basu & Riaz, 2007). 
They had planned to launch an armed struggle against the Monarchy at that time. 
However, the king announced a referendum in 1979 for a transition to multiparty 
democracy; their plan for an insurgency got diverted to supporting other political parties 
for victory against the Monarch. 
In 1983, Mohan Bikram Singh splintered away from the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Fourth Convention or Fourth Congress) and formed a separate wing of the 
communist party, identified as the Communist Party of Nepal (Masal), or CPN (Masal). 
Under Mohan Bikram Singh, CPN (Masal) became a founding member of the 
Revolutionary International Movement (RIM) ( Lawati & Pahari, 2010). Most members 
of CPN (Masal) can be considered as the main group of people that later on emerged as 
CPN (Maoist) leaders. 
In 1985, CPN (Masal) yet again split into two. The original Masal was led by 
Mohan Bikram Singh. The splinter group, which also named itself CPN (Mashal) added 
“h” to its name to sound different, was led by Mohan Vaidya (a.k.a. Kiran), who is also 
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considered as the present CPN (Maoist) ideologue and hardliner. The leaders of the 
Mashal faction are the main initiators of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. In 1986, just 
after one year, present chairman of the UCPN (Maoist), Pushpa Kamal Dahal, replaced 
Mohan Vaidya as head of the CPN (Mashal) (Lawati &Pahari, 2010). 
 
Figure 1.   Evolution of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
Source: Thapa and Sijapati, 2003, p. 44 
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In 1990, to fight against the Panchayet System (King’s rule), the radical 
communists, CPN (Fourth Convention), CPN (Mashal), Bhattarai faction of CPN 
(Masal), and Communist Party of Nepal (Peasants’ Organization) united to form the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre), or CPN (Unity Centre), and adopted Maoism 
and People’s War as the party’s ideology. Prachanda became the General Secretary of 
this Unity Centre. Lawati (2010) argues that the Unity Centre brought together the 
radical/Maoist strains of the original CPN. CPN (Unity Centre) participated in the 1991 
election under the banner of the United People’s Movement (UNPM) and won nine seats 
with 352,000 votes ( Riaz & Basu, 2007, p.126). 
The split in CPN (Unity Centre) in 1994 gave birth to the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist), led by Prachanda. In 1992 CPN (Unity Centre) had promoted a violent 
general strike in Nepal, but the Nepali Congress Party’s government suppressed the 
strike. The repression by the ruling party triggered inner-party debate over the 
appropriate political strategy of CPN (Unity Centre). A faction supported participation in 
the parliamentary election; radicals stuck to the line of People’s War. These differences 
led to a further split and gave rise to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), led by 
Prachanda. The rest of CPN (Unity Centre) remained under the leadership of Nirmal 
Lama (Basu, 2007).  
In Nepal, the communist parties have a long-standing history of splitting when 
and if some ideological differences or opportunities arise. Since the establishment of 
Communist Party of Nepal, there have been more than a dozen splits in the party (Thapa, 
2005). Disregarding their historical trends of splitting, Prachanda chose to accept the 
costs of a party split and go ahead with his agenda based on communist ideology. 
1. Who Is Prachanda? 
On December 11, 1954, Chabilal Dahal—also known as these three names: 
Pushpa Kamal, ”Biswas,” and “Prachanda”—was born into the poor family of Muktiram 
Dahal in Lewadi, a village in Kaski district, west of Kathmandu (Britannica, 2010). He 
was raised in Chitawan, where he moved from his village in Kaski at the age of 11. As a 
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child, he was hard working and helped in household work. In schools, he was an average 
student who did not stand out among his peers (Jane’s Intelligence, 2006). 
Chabilal was the eldest of the eight children in his family, and the younger 
children all looked up to him for guidance. After school young Chabilal cooked food for 
the family, milked the cows, and herded the family buffaloes in the village. 
Roy (2008) argues that Chabilal as a child was an easy-going, fun-loving 
schoolboy. In studies, he was an average child who had difficulties in distinguishing 
between three and six in Nepali. He failed in class III. As a child from a very young age 
he was emotional, honest, and sincere (Roy, 2008, p. 11). 
Chabilal was renamed Pushpa Kamal Dahal after his English teacher, Raj Krishna 
Kandel, thought that Chabilal deserved a more appropriate name—Pushpa Kamal (Lotus) 
(Roy, 2008, p. 12). At the age of 15, even before finishing high school, Puspa Kamal 
Dahal got married to Sita Paudel. Although she did not attain school, she was literate 
(Roy, 2008). She received her primary education at home. 
After completing high school, he wanted to get admission in Amrit Science 
College or Trichandra College, the best science colleges at that time in Nepal. However, 
due to his late arrival and lack of money, he was not admitted into any of those colleges; 
nevertheless, he got admission into Patan Multiple Campus and studied science. 
In Patan, as the campus did not have hostel facilities, he had to stay outside in a 
rented house, where he got an opportunity to make connections with communist leaders 
and had access to communist literature. Roy (2010) argues, although he was a science 
student, he was reading books on social science and communism more than books on 
course materials. 
After two years of college in Patan, he joined the Institute of Agriculture and 
Animal Science (IAAS) at Rampur in his home district, Chitawan. It was during this time 
that Pushpa Kamal Dahal started reaching out to develop his communist career by 
keeping close affiliation with local communist leaders and by influencing his own friends 
in communist ideologies (Roy, 2008). 
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Not getting a job after completing a three-year degree program in agriculture and 
animal science frustrated him. In the hunt for a job he travelled even on foot for long 
distances in the eastern part of the country with no results at all. Pressed by financial 
needs, at last he found a job in a rural development project sponsored by United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). In this project, he worked for three 
months and resigned to take a job as a science teacher at Bhimodaya Secondary School in 
Gorkha district. This job gave him more time and the environment to engage himself in 
politics. 
2. Becoming a Leader 
Roy (2008) says that Dahal’s perspective on life and ideology changed 
completely after witnessing an incident where his father was humiliated by a local 
moneylender. In one occasion, as Roy argues, “…my father fell on the money lender’s 
feet. But the money lender kicked him. It lit a fire inside me. It was a political lesson I 
would never forget. It changed the course of my life” (p. 13). After the incident, he 
started getting interested in books on revolutions. 
Furthermore, at an early age, he was indoctrinated in communism by Chandra Raj 
Bhurtel, a schoolteacher (Britannica, 2010). However, it is believed that he had been 
fascinated by the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Having studied the Chinese revolution 
and Marxism in his own time, he became inclined towards the communist ideology and 
started his early political life in mid-1970.  
It was only after he resigned from his school job in 1979, as a teacher, and 
became a full member of the communist party, that he entirely devoted himself to 
communist politics. Within two years of taking full membership, in 1980, Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal “Biswas” (a nom de guerre meaning “trust”) was tasked to lead the All Nepal 
National Free Students’ Union (Revolutionary), which was affiliated with the radical 
Communist Party of Nepal (Masal), or CPN (Masal) (Masal means flame in Nepalese). It 
was during this period that Biswas met a number of communist leaders, including Mohan 
Vaidya and Bhakta Bahadur Shrestha as well as the young communist leader Ram 
Bahadur Thapa.  
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Very shortly after leading the students’ union for three years, in 1984, at the age 
of 29, he was elected to the Central Committee of the CPN (Masal). In November 1984, 
the Fifth General Convention of the radical Communist Party of Nepal (Masal) elected 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Comrade Biswas, to the Central Committee (Roy, 2008, p. 
26). 
In 1985, due to an ideological difference between Mohan Bikram Singh and 
Mohan Vaidhya, the CPN (Masal) split into two factions. CPN (Masal) was led by 
Mohan Bikram Singh; Mohan Vaidya became the leader of CPN (Mashal). Pushpa 
Kamal Dahal allied himself with Vaidya.  
The CPN (Mashal) under Vaidya’s leadership planned and adopted a violent 
doctrine in the hope of instigating mass uprising. A part of the strategy was to attack 
some isolated police posts and blacken the faces of the king’s statues located in the 
capital. The armed operation was code-named Sector Kanda (sector incident). During 
this operation, some of the party cadres, among them Om Subedi, were arrested; due to 
these arrests, the party became publicly known through police interrogation.  
After this action exposed the underground party, it was heavily criticized by the 
central committee members. The failed action became the reason for Vaidhya’s downfall, 
and Pushpa Kamal Dahal unanimously emerged as the general secretary of the party in 
1989, the position he has held since (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003). 
After assuming the post of general secretary and finding the treasury of the party 
nearly empty, he realized something had to be done to raise money for the party to 
function. Finding no alternatives, he decided to sell his land to run the party (Roy, 2008, 
p. 27). He started to reorganize the party and called a Central Committee meeting in 
Chitawan, which made the decision to change the noms de guerre of the leaders. 
It was during this meeting that Pushpa Kamal Dahal transformed himself from 
“Biswas” (Trust) to “Prachanda” (Valiant One) (Roy, 2008). All other top leaders also 
changed their previous noms de guerre. 
In 1990, three radical left communist parties, including Fourth Congress and 
Mashal, formed a new party called Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre). In this new  
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union among radicals Prachanda was also smart enough to secure his position as the 
general secretary. Since then he has always been in the top-most leadership position of 
the party. 
The unity among the leadership of the CPN (Unity Center) did not last long. The 
ideological differences among the leaders over whether to participate in the election or 
not to participate led to a split in the party. A faction supported participation in the 
parliamentary election, but radicals stuck to the line of people’s war. These differences 
led to further splits and gave rise to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), led by 
Prachanda. The other faction of CPN (Unity Center) remained under Nirmal Lama (Basu, 
2007). 
B. ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL CONDITION OF NEPAL 
1. Economic  
After the new political set-up, 1993/94 saw some promising results. GDP growth 
was 7.9 percent; the tourism sector was able to contribute 4 percent to the GDP. But the 
momentum did not last. The growth rate decelerated in 1995 due to political instability, 
bad governance, and rampant corruption among the political parties (Lawati &Pahari, 
2010). 
The new political set-up after the 1991 election failed to include all the sectors of 
Nepalese societies, ethnic groups, and castes. Most of these groups remained and felt that 
they were outside the mainstream politics and reach of the national resources. As Thapa 
(2008) argues: 
…traditional regional disparities continued and far-flung areas like the 
district of Karnali Zone remained under-represented in politics, planning, 
and the development processes. In the meantime the gap between the 
people in the villages and the cities and between the rich and poor 
continued to widen. (p. 13)  
In this political environment, the absolute number of poor increased in 1990; the 
government statistics show around 40% of the people as poor. Even though this 
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percentage remained the same from the 1970s to the 1990s, the absolute number of poor 
persons doubled due to increase in the population (Lawati &Pahari, 2010). 
There was a great deal of infrastructure development in the early 1990s, 
especially in the banking sector, private schools, and air transportation; and many 
development projects emerged in the country. However, these developments only 
benefited those who were already well off and the society who were in urban settings or 
around them. The people in the remote areas of Nepal were deprived from the benefits of 
the democratic system. 
As Lawati (2010) argues, “Inequality increased in Nepal despite improved 
national economic indicators. Nepal had become the most in equal country in South Asia 
in the 1990s with the highest Gini Index of 0.426” (p. 15). 
2. Social Structure 
Nepalese society is basically divided into a four-caste class system by Hindu 
religion. However, Lawati (2010) argues, “Nepal not only faced class inequality, but 
extreme socio-cultural inequality also existed among numerous linguistic, ethnic, 
religious, racial, caste and regional groups” (p. 10). He further argues that in Nepal, the 
Caste Hill Hindu Elite Males (CHHEM) has monopolized the political, economic, social, 
and cultural powers. However, the present statistic of monopolization of power by 
CHHEM cannot be attributed only to the present and the near-past governments of the 
country; it goes beyond a few centuries. The society has been divided as such since the 
rise and acceptance of Hindu tradition. The social functions have been divided according 
to the castes. To transform a society from a preexisting system to a new one needs more 
commitments from all sectors of the society. 
There are about sixty ethnic and caste groups in the country; among them-Bahun 
Chetri and Newar are economically, politically, and socially dominant.  In the post-1991 
democratic system, the presence of the indigenous nationalities decreased in some 
institutions as compared to the Panchayet (pre-democracy government) era (Lawati & 
Pahari, 2010).  
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The majority of these ethnic groups have never had access to the state resources. 
Civil servants operate from Kathmandu; all political and developmental decisions are 
centralized and seen as the hub of the national life. The welfare of the people of the 
remote areas is completely ignored; it was like this during the Panchayet System and 
remained the same during the democratic system. 
Thapa (2003) argues, Bahun and Chetries together constitute only 29% of the 
population, and yet have almost total command over the states’ resources. Even during 
the democratic rule the state continued with the policy of exclusion.  
3. Political 
In 1990, after the mass movement led by pro-democratic parties who had been 
kept out of the political system until then, an understanding was reached between the 
king and the democratic parties; Panchayet System was replaced by a constitutional 
monarch with multiparty democracy. Democratic political changes in 1991 gave rise to 
high expectations among the people for a better, more prosperous life. Unity among all 
the stakeholders behind a democratic agenda and a belief that a democratic political 
freedom would rapidly and quickly transform into progress and prosperity did not 
materialize, and the situation deteriorated. 
 As Thapa (2007) argues, 
the idealism of the movement soon gave way to Nepali realities—parties 
poorly prepared to exercise democratic power, old patronage structure 
remained intact, limited scope left for sustained economic growth, the 
antiquated centralized state continued, and government lacked capacity, 
expertise and will to convert ideas into successful policy. (p. 37) 
 After the change to democracy in early 1991, Thapa and Sijapati (2003) argue, 
even  
as the parliamentary exercises proceeded, there was no improvement in 
the socio-economic condition of people. Governance remained in 
shambles as political parties expanded their energy in power plays… 
corruption soared unchecked. The gap between rich and poor grew wider. 
(p. 64) 
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The politics and political agendas did not go beyond the capital, Kathmandu. 
Thapa and Sijapati (2003) argue: 
The centralized system remained intact. Kathmandu, the nation’s capital 
which contains all forms of economic and political power, is the place 
where decisions regarding the appropriation, distribution and realization of 
surplus generated are made… because major decisions are made in the 
centre, the prospects, aspirations, and needs of the people from the 
periphery do not get represented. They are often ignored or the decision 
makers are unaware of the need of the rural region. (p. 61). 
Centralization concentrates power in the hands of a few state agencies, with 
power exercised by only a few people. The politics among the parties focused more on 
getting into government rather than fulfilling the aspirations of the people. There were 
continuous intra-party conflicts for the post of Prime Minister, which led into party splits 
among the major parties—Nepali Congress as well as Communist Party of Nepal-United 
Marxist-Leninists. 
The post-1990 democratic politics can be characterized as chaos among and 
within the political parties. From 1991 to 2002, four parliamentary elections occurred, 
thirteen government changes, and four recommendations to dissolve the House of 
Representatives. As Thapa and Sijapati argue,  
Not one of the 13 governments that have held power since 1991 has done 
anything to liberate the rural peasantry, who constitute a majority of the 
population, from the exploitative land relationships existing in the 
villages. (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003, p. 61) 
The Nepali Congress Party (NCP) was the main stakeholder in the post-1991 
politics. It got the majority in the first parliamentary election; the Nepali Congress Party 
(NCP) won 110 seats in the 205-member House of Representatives and formed a 
government. Due to Krishna Prasad Bhattarai’s (then President of NCP) loss in the 
election, Girija Prasad Koirala became the Prime Minister of Nepal.  
Instead of ruling the country democratically, transparently, abiding by rule of law, 
and promoting strong democratic institutions, the Nepali Congress took a critical turn 
towards a clientelistic pattern of mobilization. Power was shared through networks of 
informal dyadic relations that linked individuals to unequal power. The political power of 
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the country was vested in a few top individuals who personally decided how to distribute 
resources according to personal preferences (Thapa, 2005). 
Even having the majority in the parliament, intra-party conflict in the NCP led 
Prime Minister Koirala to dissolve the parliament. Dissolving parliament at the wish of 
the Prime Minister initiated an unhealthy political game that spread throughout the 
internal democratic politics of the country. Man Mohan Adhikari, a communist Prime 
Minister, made a similar decision to dissolve the parliament when he faced a vote of no 
confidence in the parliament. However, this time the Supreme Court over-ruled the 
decision. 
When no single party won a majority in the second Parliamentarian election, 
coalition governments were formed and ousted frequently. This trend of forming and 
breaking coalitions led the country towards instability, corruption, and bad governance; 
furthermore, the people lost their trust in political parties (Thapa, 2005). It was during 
this time that the Maoists were vigorously preparing for their armed struggle in Nepal. 
The government, busy in the intra- and inter-party conflicts, failed to understand the 
situation in the remote villages of Nepal.  
4. Prachanda’s Vision to Victory 
After the 1990 political changes, the country became politically unstable, socially 
divided, and economically deprived. Furthermore, increasing unrest due to an increasing 
number of strikes generated frustration. Under these conditions, Prachanda was, slowly 
but surely, putting his ideas of launching an armed struggle against a government into 
practice.  
The gap between the rich and the poor was increasing each day; the majority of 
the population did not have a share in the governance; only people in the urban areas and 
close to power centers had access to state resources. The people of rural Nepal were left 
behind without any services and opportunities. The dreams that democracy would 
provide prosperity in life were fading away for the Nepalese people. 
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Since joining the communist party at an early age, Prachanda was dedicated to 
revolution. He seemed to be waiting for the right time and the right political and social 
conditions in the country. He had spent much of his early age studying revolution (Roy, 
2008).  
5. Preparation for the Insurgency 
In 1984, realizing that without ideological support from the outside world, armed 
struggle in Nepal would be difficult; the Communist Party of Nepal (Mashal) became a 
founding member of the Revolutionary International Movement (RIM). Moreover, prior 
to committing himself to revolution, Prachanda had established connections with other 
revolutionary leaders and organizations abroad. The Maoists gained a lot of theoretical 
knowledge from Chairman Robert Avakin of the Revolutionary Party of the USA (Roy, 
2008, p. 39). 
To get familiar with guerilla warfare, Prachanda was trained by ex-Gorkha 
soldiers in India (Roy, 2008). Prachanda had also established a link with Ram Raja Pratap 
Singh, a Nepalese revolutionist living in exile. Prachanda met Ram Raja Prasad Singh 
personally and learned how to make bombs. It is also argued that the bombs used in the 
early stages of the insurgencies were made from the same technologies taught by Ram 
Raja Pratap Singh (Roy, 2008, p. 186). 
Prachanda was also connected to, and developed a very close relation with, 
Ganapati, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India. To get a firsthand 
experience, Prachanda visited many places where the insurgencies were taking places in 
India. He had studied the movements in Bihar (India) and Jharkhanda (Roy, 2008, p. 91). 
He also visited the southern Indian state of Andra Pradesh. 
Prior to launching an insurgency, a detailed study of the situation of the country 
had been done. The “Document Adopted by the Third Expanded Meeting of the Central 
Committee of the CPN (Maoist) in March, 1995” examined the possibility of armed 
struggle in Nepal. It concludes: 
In our situation, the armed struggle can be initiated, sustained and 
developed only through a skillful implementation of a policy which would 
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go like this—give priority to the rural work, but do not leave out the urban 
work; give priority to illegal struggle, but do not leave out the legal 
struggle, too; give priority to specific strategic areas, but do not leave out 
work related to the mass movement, too; give priority to class struggle in 
rural areas, but do not leave out countrywide struggle, too; give priority to 
guerrilla actions, but do not leave out political exposure and propaganda, 
too; give priority to propaganda work within the country but do not leave 
out worldwide propaganda, too; give priority to build army organization, 
but do not leave out building front organizations, too; give priority to 
relying on one’s own organization and force, but do not fail to forge unity- 
in- action, to take support and help from the international arena. Neither 
by getting one-sided, nor by giving equal emphasis to all work, can the 
People’s War be initiated, preserved and developed in the present context. 
From this point of view the People’s War will unfold as a total war. (CPN 
[Maoist], 1995) 
Furthermore, on the overall social and political situations of the country, the 
document argues that the revolution is possible in the country. The Nepalese people are 
historically violent; the reforms up until today are the consequences of the violent nature 
of the Nepalese people. The paper also argues that the Nepalese people will lay down 
their lives on the issues of nationalism (CPN [Maoist], 1995). 
Socially, since 1951 anti-establishment sentiment among the Nepalese people has 
been very strong. In terms of physical and mental strength, the paper argues that the 
Nepalese people are great warriors and can bear the severe material and bodily hardship 
while in the war (CPN [Maoist], 1995). 
However, in terms of their aim of the armed struggle, the document is confusing 
instead of offering a clear-cut vision. The document reads: 
The long-term aim of the party is to move towards socialist revolution 
after the successful completion of New Democratic revolution as an 
integral part of the world proletarian socialist revolution and to achieve 
communism by waging Cultural Revolution under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. (CPN [Maoist], 1995) 
It is difficult to make clear sense out of the above phrase. However, in the same 
document it is also stated that the nature and orientation of the Nepalese armed struggle 
would be, “in the line of protracted people’s war based upon the strategy of encircling the 
city from the countryside” (CPN [Maoist], 1995). 
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For the first phase of the insurgency, Prachanda had specifically identified feudal 
individuals, industries, financial institutions, and bureaucratic capitalists as targets. The 
confiscated land would be distributed to the landless or poor communities of the society. 
The leadership made an in-depth evaluation of the overall condition of the country 
as well as their advantages and disadvantages to launch an insurgency. They also 
categorically differentiated the social groups that were easy and those difficult to 
motivate. The strength and weaknesses of the government and their party were also 
considered in advance. By analyzing the overall political, geographical and social 
environment of the country, the leadership concluded (CPN [Maoist], 1995) that: 
1. The geographical situation is the most favorable for waging guerilla war 
with a direct link with the people. 
2. Nepalese armed struggle cannot take the form of a direct or positional 
warfare against the enemy at the beginning. Attack the enemy’s weak 
spots in piecemeal. 
3. Initiate and develop guerilla wars in different parts of the country by 
taking peasant revolution as the backbone. 
4. People’s support will increase if the tactics are pursued carefully. 
5. Mobilize the people abroad, especially in India, for logistic purposes. 
The leadership was also cautious, noticing “… it is impossible for armed struggle 
in Nepal to make a quick leap into an insurrection and defeat the enemy; however, it is 
possible by systematic development of it.” (CPN [Maoist], 1995) The leadership also 
seemed to be very much concerned about people isolating them; they emphasized to 
“…grasp firmly that the People’s war is the war of the masses and it can be developed 
only by relying on the masses and principally on the peasants and the masses are the 
creators of history” (CPN [Maoist], 1995). On the matter of combatants, Prachanda is 
also cautious:  “…not to permit, at any cost, a situation where a gun would control the 
party (CPN [Maoist], 1995).  
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6. Strategy and Methods 
The CPN (Maoist) followed Mao’s strategy of guerilla warfare and mass political 
mobilization in the pursuit of a communist republic (Lawati, 2010). Prachanda initially 
followed Mao’s three-stage strategy for people’s revolution that had worked in China. 
The insurgency is divided in three phases: 1) strategic defence, 2) strategic balance, and 
3) strategic offence (Sharma, 2004). The goal was to surround the centre with rural 
peasant mobilization in the traditional Mao style. 
To fullfill these strategic goals Prachanda had primed his party and leadership. In 
1995 the Prachanda-led Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre) held its third plenum, 
during which the leadership renamed it the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)—CPN 
(Maoist)—and decided to begin an insurgency (Deepak & Sijapati, 2003). The leadership 
began with their long preparations for the insurgency (Lawati, 2010).  
Before launching their insurgency, the CPN (Maoist) had developed their 
organization and organized awareness and training programs in the rural areas of Nepal 
to prepare cadres. Among the people, they also indoctrinated a collective political 
imagination for social justice and prosperity in life (Eck, 2010). 
The Maoists expanded their organization and made it stronger by establishing an 
army and opening new Unified Front Organizations (International Crisis Group 
[ICG],2005). The fronts and the sister organizations were used during attacks to help 
combatants for adminstrative purposes as well as for calling strikes and street protests in 
district headquarters and cities. 
To implement their initial plan and motivate their cadres, the Maoists came up 
with a flexible timetable and slogans. The slogans focused on what was required to be 
done during a particular phase of insurgency. It also gave the general public an indication 
of what the Maoists were up to at any given point in time. 
The first plan, which lasted only one month, came at the initial phase of the 
insurgency in 1996 (Sharma, 2004). The slogan read, “Let us move ahead on the path of 
the people’s war to establish the new people’s democratic state by destroying the 
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reactionary state.” (CPN [Maoist], 1995)  This plan mainly focused on showing the 
people the initiation of Maoist insurgency in Nepal. During this first phase about 6,000 
“people’s” actions (a person beaten or threatened or land confiscated) were carried out. 
Eighty percent of this plan was focused on publicity (Sharma, 2004, p. 51). 
The second plan, from March 1996 to June 1997, said, “Develop a people’s war 
in a more organized way.” (CPN [Maoist], 1995)  It also included strong action for 
“eliminating selected enemies.” (CPN [Maoist], 1995) According to this plan there were 
many killings of individuals, the first two being policemen in the Tak village of Rukum 
(Sharma, 2004). The third plan in 1997 had the slogan, “Raising the development of 
guerilla warfare to new heights.”  (CPN [Maoist], 1995) This plan was said to make the 
insurgents able to fight the Army. During this plan, the Maoists also boycotted the local 
elections; furthermore, they started to threaten the elected body to force them to resign 
from their posts. Due to a vacuum created by lack of an elected body, the Maoists began 
exercising their rule in some rural areas (Sharma, 2004). 
The fourth plan started in 1998 and had a stronger slogan, indicating that the 
insurgents were getting stronger. It read, “Let’s embark on the great path of creating base 
areas.”  (CPN [Maoist], 1998) During this period, the Maoists were also successful in 
organizing an international rally in Delhi in support of their insurgency in Nepal. 
In February 2001, after completing its sixth plan, the CPN (Maoist) organized its 
Second National Conference. This was taken as a new turning point in the history of the 
Nepalese Maoist insurgency. The new post of Chairman was created for Prachanda. 
Prachanda also presented a report titled, “The Great Leap Forward: An Inevitable Need 
of History,” which, after discussion, was adopted as the party’s doctrine, the “Prachanda 
Path.” 
Roy (2008) argues that the concept of Prachanda Path was initially inspired by the 
doctrine of the Communist Party of Peru-Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalo Thought. 
Prachanda Path in essence is a different kind of uprising, which can be described as the 
fusion of the Chinese model of a protracted people’s war strategy (to extend from the 
villages to the cities) and the Russian model of a general armed revolution (Roy, 2008, p. 
64). 
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Lok Raj Baral, a political scientist in Nepal, writing on Prachanda Path in Roy 
(2008), explains: 
Prachanda Path adopted by the Maoists, does not apparently make an 
ideological break with Lenin and Mao, but they find that the doctrine and 
strategies adopted by the two leaders cannot be replicated wholesale in the 
Nepali situation. Prachanda Path is, thus, taken as a fusion of an 
insurgency and a protracted war. Lenin had used the first during the 
October Revolution and Mao used the second in China. Applying it to the 
Nepali context, Prachanda Path seems to adopt urban and a protracted 
people’s war. (p. 64) 
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III. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES: KEY EVENTS 
A. INSIDE GAMES 
 This chapter focuses on the internal differences among the leadership inside the 
Maoist Insurgency and external constraints posed by the state and other stakeholders that 
challenged the growth of the insurgency. Further, it analyzes how these differences and 
constraints were dealt with and managed by Prachanda to give an overall better or worse 
outcome for the insurgency, either helping it grow or decreasing its popular support. 
These internal and external differences, challenges, and opportunities are termed in this 
thesis as “inside” and “outside” games. When these games are managed and manipulated 
well, these opportunities will yield a positive outcome for the insurgency’s growth; if 
mismanaged, they can be counterproductive.  
Internal conflicts and differences among the Maoist leadership can be traced back 
to various alliances and divisions that occurred during the formation of what we know 
today as the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). Since the formation of the 
hardliner radical communist party, the Communist Party of Nepal (Fourth Convention) in 
1983, the leadership encountered ideological differences, which resulted in numerous 
splits in the party.  
Close observation of the CPN (Maoist) leadership has shown signs of ideological 
differences among the top three leaders. Their differences are reported more so than in 
the recent past, which could be due to the fact that they are in the open and under media 
scrutiny. While all three are committed to their hardliner communist ideologies, they 
disagree about whether the party should take a hard-line or moderate stance within the 
national and international political environments. There have been differences explicitly 
in approaches the party should take in particular circumstances and points in time.  
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, “Prachanda,” is regarded to be a dedicated and a 
charismatic leader, with a good grip on the party rank and file. His ability to balance the 
hardliners and moderates has not only kept him in the present position since the time he 
became General Secretary of CPN (Mashal) in 1989; but it is also much needed for the 
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unity of the party. Lawati (2010) states that Prachanda is skilled in balancing different 
factions and leaders, for instance, through incorporating issues raised by others into the 
official party line (Lawati, 2010, p. 13). This was evident during the Chunbang meeting 
and Kharipati national convention. 
Mohan Vaidya, “Kiran,” the founding leader of CPN (Masal), the faction that 
split from Mohan Bikram Singh’s CPN (Mashal), is the instrumental person for 
Prachanda’s rise up to Central Committee Member and Politburo Member of the CPN 
(Fourth Convention) (Roy, 2008). Vaidya, a hard-line communist ideologue who 
advocates for a People’s Republic and a single-party communist dictatorship, was elected 
to the current Constituent Assembly, but resigned, citing differences within the party.  
Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, “a scholar with a bright career”-turned revolutionist, is 
considered to be a moderate and pragmatic politician. He is also considered as the main 
ideologue who advocates for a moderate path within the Maoist party politics.  
Although there are rifts among the top leaders, Prachanda has maintained the 
party unity since the beginning of the insurgency. The unity among them alone is a major 
factor that elevated the party to the present status. However, since the party joined the 
mainstream politics, especially after the Kharipati convention in which the top leadership 
was heavily blamed for too much flexibility in negotiations with the seven party 
alliances, the differences within the party are alarming. 
This chapter looks into various conflicts/differences that have emerged within the 
party up to its present status, and how Prachanda was able to keep the balance and save 
the party from a split. Prachanda successfully led his party into mainstream politics, 
secured a maximum number of seats in the Constituent Assembly election, and formed a 
government under his own leadership. However, a greater question lies ahead: Can he 
play a similar role in open politics where multiple national and international players 
influence an outcome that a single party seeks to obtain?  
In contrast to the recognition he has received for his skilled leadership that 
brought the party out into the open politics, the prevailing observation is that the role he 
played as the Prime Minister (PM) and later as the leader of the opposition party could 
 29
have been better. His miscalculated decisions (attacks on the judiciary system, media 
houses, religious places, and army institutions), the party’s souring relationship with the 
country’s southern neighbor, the Young Communist League’s ever-increasing coercive 
actions around the nation, and the lack of commitment to past agreements have raised 
questions regarding the Maoists’ intent and credibility. Furthermore, a nationwide strike 
called by the Maoists proved to be counterproductive as there was increasing loss of faith 
and trust in Prachanda, both nationally and internationally. 
On the other hand, since the beginning of the peace process, Dr. Bhattarai has 
been slowly getting stronger within his party and gaining trust among national and 
international powerhouses. Prachanda’s anti-Indian rhetoric helped Dr. Bhattarai, known 
to have close links with Indian authorities, to stand out as a new leader to head the party 
in a new, open, and competitive political environment. Furthermore, the leaders of other 
political parties seem to be more comfortable working with Dr. Bhattarai as other parties 
start to question Prachanda’s motives and failure to abide by promises and agreements 
from the past.  
Events that are attributed to bringing CPN (Maoist) to internal conflict and the 
brink of splitting are worth examining to gauge Prachanda’s ability to lead and to put his 
party in favorable strategic positions. 
1. Chunbang Plenum 2005 
Why does a growing insurgency, with an aim to establishing a communist 
dictatorship, which is not facing any grave threat from the existing establishment, engage 
in negotiations? The rational answer to this question could be: 1) for strategic gains, 2) 
for a strategic pause to reorganize the growth of the party or, 3) to avoid a party split due 
to internal differences. In the case of CPN (Maoist), it could be argued that all three are 
possible. 
It is evident that there are two distinct ideological differences between the CPN 
(Maoist) party hardliners, as led by Kiran, and moderates, led by Dr. Bhattarai. 
Moderates within the party call for a peaceful and democratic approach, whereas the 
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hardliners insist on their idea of “absolute power with the barrel of a gun.” Prachanda, as 
the chairman of the party, has acted and established himself as the necessary force within 
the party to moderate the differences and maintain unity. The histories of the communist 
parties in Nepal indicate that the unity between them has not always lasted for very long, 
and there have been moments where CPN (Maoist) have been faced with a split. 
In 2001, during the first peace talks, it was the military faction that chose to walk 
out of the negotiations (Riaz & Basu, 2007). In 2003, both factions decided to walk out of 
the talks due to a military attack during the ceasefire that killed their cadres. In the 
Chunbang and Kharipati national conventions, the rift reached a level at which some 
actions (punitive) and precautions (security) had to be taken to settle the differences.   
In late 2004 or early 2005, relations between Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai 
soured. This was reportedly due to growing disagreements on power sharing as well as 
party policies, particularly on the way the Monarchy and India should be perceived. Dr. 
Bhattarai, who is recognized to be pro-India, showed his resentment against the 
consolidation of power under Prachanda and his plan for anti-Indian sentiment. Similarly, 
the decision to build an alliance with the King rather than with other major political 
parties came into the media and shook the party leadership. Dr. Bhattarai’s push to work 
with other democratic alliances, rather than with the King, challenged the majority 
decision of the party. This rift almost split the party after it was leaked to the media. 
Subsequently, the Politburo meeting in Lahabang decided to take punitive action against 
three Politburo members: Hishila Yami, Dina Nath Sharma, and Bhattarai (Ogura, 2008). 
However, the King’s actions on February 1, 2005, made it easier for the 
democratic parties to forge an alliance to fight against the King’s move. According to 
Bhattarai, “After the King’s coup, our internal dispute over issues of priority was 
automatically resolved because it had become clear that he was the main enemy. 
Actually, the King’s move against the state brought us together” (Ogura, 2008, p. 21). Dr. 
Bhattarai was released soon after the King’s move, and the Maoists held a meeting in 
Chunbang (a village in Rolpa), and discussed Bhattarai’s concept on working with the 
other political parties. After the discussions, the party came forward with a new concept 
to align with political parties to overthrow the Monarchy. 
 31
Dr. Bhattarai, who, in addition to pushing for alliance with other democratic 
parties, had been also advocating for a decentralized approach in the party structure. 
These ideas have established Dr. Bhattarai as a visionary leader as well.  
2. Kharipati Convention 2008 
The CPN (Maoist) also avoided splitting at the national convention held during 
November 17–26, 2008, in Bhaktapur, Kharipati. Opposing Chairman Prachanda's 
document, another senior leader, Kiran, produced a  contrary document. The conclave 
ended when a consensus was made to incorporate the spirit of both the documents and 
produce a new one (Chandrasekharan, 2007). 
The cadres were split up into two groups. The majority—including senior leaders 
C. P. Gajurel, Hari Bhakta Kandel, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, and Netra Bikram Chand—
supported Senior Leader Kiran's document. Chairman Prachanda and his supporters, as 
well as Baburam Bhattarai and Barsaman Pun, were shocked to see the majority in favor 
of Leader Mohan Vaidya, “Kiran.” Kiran presented a document that claimed that a 
suitable time had come for a popular uprising and setting up a people's republic, contrary 
to Chairman Prachanda, who produced a document stating that the party should move 
ahead with creating a new statute in favor of the people and a tactical slogan for a 
People’s Republic (Sigdel, 2008). 
The conclave held several levels of discussion where some disputes regarding the 
team leader, Prachanda, arose. The team who supported Kiran's document had a leader 
who favored Prachanda's document and vice-versa. The meeting ended up compromising 
both documents, which would again be presented in the future National Convention 
(Sigdel, 2008).  
The groups supporting Kiran's document blamed Prachanda's group for betraying 
the spirit of the people's war and for being more interested in luxury after having held 
power. Chairman Prachanda was also blamed for sidelining the revolutionary leaders 




supported his steps. The Kharipati national convention was a second time when huge 
differences within the leadership came out in public after the Chunbang meeting (Sigdel, 
2008).  
 Prachanda and Kiran placed their proposal documents before the Central 
Committee. In those documents the main differences centered on, first, how to synthesize 
all the experiences acquired since the initiation of the people’s war in order to have a 
deeper grasp of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the Prachanda Path. The second concern 
was how to develop political and tactical slogans so as to help unite all of the allies of the 
people’s revolution and isolate the principal enemy. The third was how to develop under 
the leadership of the party a coordinated mechanism for the three fronts of struggle, 
namely the street, the constituent assembly, and the government, and how to decide 
which one to make the principal struggle. The central committee meeting, held during the 
convention, reached a compromise, which was later ratified by the convention. The main 
points of the compromise reached were as follows: 
First, it was decided to bring out a single document at the next Central Committee 
meeting, organize an internal forum based on the Leninist concept of “freedom in 
expression and unity in action'' prior to the forthcoming party congress, and thereby 
synthesize the experiences and ideological and political positions that the Maoists had 
taken up during 10 years of people’s war, 19 days of mass movement, the ongoing peace 
process, and so forth. So, the whole synthesis was deferred until the coming party 
congress (Sigdel, 2008). 
Second, the Central Committee meeting developed a skeleton of a unanimous 
immediate political program, “People’s Federal Democratic National Republic,” or, “the 
People’s Republic,” which was, in fact, a synthesized expression of the programs, 
“Federal and Competitive Pro-people Republic'' and “National Federal People’s 
Republic'' that Chairman Prachanda and  Kiran had proposed respectively through their 
documents. 
Third, the Central Committee meeting decided to build up a mechanism under 
party leadership to coordinate all three fronts of struggle in which the street struggle 
would be the principal one (Sigdel, 2008). 
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By compromising, once again Prachanda was able to rescue the party by engaging 
in serious discussions and making ideological compromises from a split within the party. 
The leadership convinced the cadres who were agitating against the leadership to settle 
down and accept the mistakes the leadership had committed while in power; in turn, the 
leadership promised not to repeat those mistakes in the future. The leadership was united 
by accepting the core ideas of both papers and converted them into a single document. 
B. OUTSIDE GAMES 
1. Negotiations With the Government  
The Maoists’ armed struggle until 2001 was on a relatively easy path without 
much scrutiny by and fight from the government. The government’s countermeasures, 
police operations Romeo and Kilo Sierra Two, all proved to be ineffective and 
counterproductive. Instead of suppressing the insurgency, they alienated the people from 
trusting the government. The extra-judicial killing of the innocent people forced the 
people to join the Maoists to take revenge (Thapa, 2003). 
By 2001, the Maoists’ sixth plan had ended, and Prachanda had concluded that 
the insurgency was successful as per their plans. Due to the assassination of King 
Birendra on June 1, 2001, allegedly by then–Crown Prince Dipendra, the king’s brother, 
Gyanendra, became the new king of Nepal. This may have compelled the Maoist 
leadership to adjust their party policy vis-a-vis the new king and a new political 
environment in the country (CPN [M], 2001). 
Since the Maoists had launched their insurgency, there had been no improvement 
in the political situation of the country; the Royal Massacre only added more to the 
uncertainty of the political situation. Taking full advantage of the fluid situation of the 
country, the Maoists turned up their insurgency attacks even more. The pressure was built 
to convince the new king of their strength and to make the most out of the initiative while 
the nation was still focused on the Royal Massacre. 
The intensity of Maoist attacks increased between 6 and 13 July 2001. A series of 
police stations were attacked in Lamjung, Nuwakot, and Holeri. “While the Maoists 
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intensified their attacks the Military strangely enough refrained from extending their 
support to beleaguered police forces at Holeri” (Riaz & Basu, 2007, p. 151). 
The military version of this episode denies that the military received any clear 
mandate from the government with all the legal process completed in order for them to 
initiate any action. The Constitution of 1991 clearly outlines the process of military 
mobilization. Article 118 of Paragraph 2 says, “His Majesty shall operate and use the 
Royal Nepal Army on the recommendation of the National Defense Council.” In the case 
of Holeri, the military leadership was only asked by then–Prime Minister Girija Prasad 
Koirala to rescue the police forces that were kept captive by the Maoists; hence, the army 
was not mobilized as per the constitution. 
Facing a situation where the military refused to function under his direct order 
and where the Maoists were harassing the state at an increasing pace, Prime Minister 
Koirala had no other alternative but to resign. He resigned from his post on 19 July 2002. 
Koirala was replaced by Sher Bahadur Deuba as the new prime minister. Deuba 
was then an up-coming leader who was challenging Koirala for the leadership and had a 
growing influence in the party. The Maoists seemed to be optimistic towards the new 
prime minister, namely due to three reasons: 1) Prime Minster Koirala, who had wanted 
to mobilize the army against them, was ousted; 2) Deuba’s rhetoric for peace; and 3) due 
to the external and internal political situation, they needed a pause after a continued fight 
against the government (Thapa &, 2003). 
2. First Ceasefire 2001 
Since the day they had initiated armed struggle in 1996, there was a relatively 
conducive environment within the country for the insurgency to grow in. The government 
had been always weak and fragmented due to internal and external conflicts within the 
parties. Decline in economic growth, a high unemployment rate, a surge in the 
unemployed youth population (35% of population aged 16–34), and, above all, no 
commitments of the government to address these issues were the main conditions that 
facilitated the Maoists’ growth (Lawati, 2010; Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; Sharma 2004). 
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The government’s inability to identify the problem, interparty power struggles, 
frequent government changes, and the Maoist leadership’s shrewdness in using political 
parties against each other for the Maoists’ tactical advantage all led to a rapid growth in 
the Maoist organization. As Hachhethu (2004) argues, the Maoists had cultivated internal 
contradictions and crises among the state actors—particularly conflicts among political 
parties, and confrontation between the palace/army and political parties—to enhance their 
party’s strength and capacities. 
“The Maoists, strategically in the first stage of their People’s War, remained soft 
on the Monarchy and hard on the party political machinery” (Riaz & Basu, 2007, p. 151). 
During their initial phase, the majority of the people who were assassinated were cadres 
of the Nepali Congress and CPN (UML). The military members on leave in remote 
villages were assured of their security. The Maoists convinced the army personnel that 
the fight was against the corrupt political parties, not the army. The army was told that 
the Maoists had nothing to do with the military and viewed the military as “friends.”  
In 2001, after the death of King Birendra and, more importantly, the September 
11attacks on the twin towers by Al Qaida, the national and international political 
environment changed. The change of prime minister in Nepal and the changed 
international and national political environments forced Prachanda to rethink their 
strategy. They foresaw the opportunity to further strengthen their position by entering 
into talks with the government rather than by continuing to fight in an unfavorable 
political environment (Riaz & Basu, 2007, p. 152). 
To pressure the government and to show their growth, the CPN (Maoist) 
announced for the first time its formation of the People’s Army as the military wing of its 
movement. The Maoists were following the classic strategy of combining pressure and 
compromise (Riaz and Basu, 2007, p.152). 
 As the Maoists had been on the run since the beginning of the insurgency, the 
negotiations held in 2001 can be argued to have been a “strategic pause” by the Maoists 
to publicize their movement for sympathy as well as to reorganize their growing 
movement for future growth (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2001).  
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 The talks also provided them with political prestige and elevated their position— 
from being seen as desperate— to an officially recognized counter-political force equal to 
the government. 
The negotiated ceasefire allowed them to secure the release of a large number of 
cadres who were under government captivity. Additionally they took advantage of the 
ceasefire to hold political rallies all over the country to reach out to the public. This too 
was the perfect time to demonstrate to the international community their supposed 
willingness to open a dialogue with the government for peaceful resolution to the crisis 
(Thapa & Sijapati, 2003, p. 119; Riaz & Basu, 2007, p. 152). 
The talks and ceasefire clearly showed that the Maoists could still grow stronger, 
as they were able to consolidate during this period. In addition, there were visible 
indications of a newly emerged tension among grass-roots level Maoist leaders, the 
military wing of the movement, and the peace negotiators (Riaz & Basu, 2007). 
However, the government was not ready to accept the radical demands: an interim 
government, a constitutional assembly, a new constitution, and institutionalization of a 
republic. 
As a result of the peaceful environment during the ceasefire, the Maoists were 
able to openly collect donations and strengthen the organization by organizing different 
fronts; and they walked away even stronger than when they had come to the peace talks. 
Following the collapse of the peace talks, the Maoists were able to attack police and army 
posts in 42 districts. On the other hand, the government, with much frustration, turned 
around and mobilized the army in haste. As Ogura claims, “…the CPN (M) took 
advantage of the positive climate and open environment created by the ongoing 
negotiations to expand their armed forces and increase their local power bases” (Ogura, 
2008, p. 17).  
In Ogura (2008), Bhattarai sums up the advantages they gained during the first 
peace talks: 
During the first truce, we gained more and lost less. We were able to go 
among the masses and propagate our political demands in a variety of 
ways. Internally, the more open environment allowed us to hold some 
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important meetings and training sessions. Although the negotiations were 
unsuccessful, we did not regret this at all (Ogura, 2008). 
During this period, the Maoists were also able to form district-level governing 
bodies in nearly two dozen of Nepal’s 75 districts. It is also claimed that it was during 
this time that the Maoists were able to organize, train, equip, and develop their army.   
3. Second Ceasefire 2003 
In 2001, after the first unsuccessful peace negotiation, the government declared a 
state of emergency and deployed the army against the insurgency. Military assistance to 
Nepal poured in from the USA, the UK, and India. The US and the Indian governments 
were the first ones to label the Maoists as terrorists. International attention in Nepal 
increased with the visit of Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2002. 
Despite this international assistance, Nepal’s internal political crisis among and 
within the parties lacked a unified national effort to address the growing insurgency. 
Prime Minister Deuba, due to lack of support from his own party to extend the 
emergency term, ended up dissolving the parliament. At the same time, due to Maoist 
activity, the election commission was unable to hold scheduled local elections. The 
political situation worsened when the King dismissed Deuba for his inability to hold 
elections and appointed Lokendra Bahadur Chand as the new Prime Minister.  
These rifts among the stakeholders of the country further contributed to the 
Maoists growth. While the political situation remained volatile, the Maoists increased 
their attacks on government forces around the country. They organized nationwide 
agitations on 11–13 November 2002, paralyzing the capital. After nearly one month of a 
continuous pressure on the government, the Maoists ended up assassinating Chief of 
Armed Police Krishna Mohan Shrestha in January 2003 (Basu & Riaz,2007). 
Within a few days after the assassination of the Chief of the Armed Police, the 
Chand government initiated a peace agreement. The peace initiative came at a time when 
all the other democratic parties were sidelined by the King. The political parties were 
questioning the legitimacy of Chand’s government to negotiate as parliament did not 
exist and Lokendra Bahadur Chand had been appointed as prime minister by the King 
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without approval of a parliament. For the Maoists it was an opportunity to use the 
Monarch for their own benefit and engineer a stronger rift between the Monarch and the 
political parties.  
Although sluggish, the initial phase of the negotiation seemed to be going in a 
positive direction. The Chand government had shown some flexibility on the 
government’s stand. The government had admitted the possibility of a round-table 
conference to form an all-party government; however, the Maoist leadership maintained 
their position on a constituent assembly as a precondition for their dialogue.  
At a time when the government and the Maoist leadership were in a dilemma over 
whether to continue the dialogue or not, the army attack in which 19 Maoist cadres were 
killed during the ceasefire forced the Maoists out of the negotiations. On August 28, talks 
were suspended from the Maoist side. “Both sides used the talks as a period of respite in 
the middle of a war” (Basu & Riaz, 2007, p. 175). 
Once more, the Maoist leadership had rigorously utilized the ceasefire to expand 
and strengthen their organizational capability throughout the country. It was at this time 
that the Maoists had dispatched a company of combatants (close to one hundred) to be 
deployed in the eastern part of the country, where they lacked military capabilities. It was 
only after the second ceasefire that the Maoists were able to expand their hold in the 
economically and socially better-developed eastern region of the country. 
In particular, the Maoists were able to garnish the following advantages during 
and after the second ceasefire in 2003: 
1) High profile detainees were released, including the suspected assassins of the 
Chief of Armed Police (Basu & Riaz, 2007, p. 156). 
2) They opened public relations offices in nearly all the big cities of the country and 
started direct contacts with the public. 
3) They used the ceasefire to smuggle arms and recruit cadres (Basu & Riaz, 2007). 
4) They expanded their organization where they were not able to do so during the 
insurgency, especially in the eastern part of the country, where people were better 
off economically and socially.  
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During and after both ceasefires Prachanda was successful in terms of expanding the 
organization, building public relations, accumulating funds, and getting the release of 
most of the cadres from the government jails.  
4. The Final Ceasefire 2005 
From the beginning of the armed struggle, the Maoist leadership had been smartly 
cultivating internal contradictions and crises among the state actors for their own 
benefits. At the initial stage of the insurgencies, the Maoists psychologically aligned 
themselves with the King and Royal forces, claiming an undeclared working relationship 
with the King (Aghosit karya sambhanda). At times, there were rumors on the question of 
Prachanda’s existence; some members of the royal family were accused of being 
Prachanda.  
5. Alliances With Democratic Political Parties 
To avoid the military intervention at the initial stage of their insurgency, the 
Maoist cadres in the villages were constantly convincing the members of the armed 
forces not to worry about their security. Similar reports were coming from the soldiers 
reporting from leave from their villages. However, an army barrack was attacked, and 
arms and ammunition were looted when the insurgency grew large enough to fight 
against the army. After an emergency was declared and the army mobilized, the Maoists 
started aligning themselves with whichever party was in opposition in the government. 
By doing so the Maoists distracted the focus of the ruling political parties from serious 
agendas of the country; rather, the ruling parties focused more on how to stay in power 
than give priorities to the burning issues of the country. 
The Maoists even went to the extent of, and were successful in, using individual 
leadership of other political parties against each other. In 2002, during the Holeri incident 
when then–Prime Minister Koirala tried to mobilize the army against them, they called 
Koirala a fascist determined to break the peace. However, the Maoists supported Deuba, 
a member of the same party who ousted Koirala from the post. This generated long-term 
interparty conflict inside the Nepali Congress party, which benefited the Maoists.   
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In 2005, when the Maoists reached their “Strategic Offensive” phase, the political 
power of the country was distributed equally among the three stakeholders: 1) The 
Monarch, with Royalist supporters, had control over state resources and security. 2) The 
Maoists, with their party organization, controlled the rural areas. 3) The democratic 
political parties, with stronger international support but marginal public support, were 
hardest hit among the three; however, with strong international support, they held an 
equal power in the Nepalese politics. 
Mathematically the power equation looked like all three stakeholders shared the 
same amount of authority. Mathematically one side would be out-maneuvered only when 
the other two sides aligned to outweigh the third. Although the Maoists had claimed to be 
in strategic offense, they lacked the capability to win the war militarily over the state, 
which they had realized.  
Although the Maoists claimed to have control over 70% of the total land, there 
was not a single place that the army could not go and launch an operation at the time of 
its choosing. Therefore, the Maoist claim of control meant the absence of security forces 
in all the places at all the time. The situation of Nepal was not like that of Sri Lanka, 
where geographic boundaries were divided between the rebels and the government. 
For the army it was impossible militarily to eradicate the insurgency in the 
country and to be everywhere at all times to provide security. However, they were strong 
and motivated enough to launch an operation anywhere in the country at their will. In 
terms of total control, broadly speaking, it was difficult—rather, impossible—for the 
security institutions to have a total control over the country because of geographical 
diversity, lack of poor modern communication and weak administrative arrangements. 




Figure 2.   Power distribution among the stakeholders in 2005 
Initially, the CPN (Maoist) and the King had been said to be working on a plan to 
share power in the government. There were rumors that a venue had been fixed for the 
meeting between the King and the Maoist leadership, but the timing and agendas were 
not yet fixed. Due to this equation being discussed in the party, the Dr. Bhattarai faction 
had a strong reservation against this solution. For his disagreement to accept the party 
decision to align with the King, Dr. Bhattarai, his supporters, and his wife, Hisila Yami, 
were kept in custody. Dr. Baburam advocated making alliances with other democratic 
parties to abolish the Monarch from Nepal. 
Unfortunately, for the King, the Royal takeover of the executive power of the 
country on 1 February 2005 generated suspicion among Maoists about the King’s 
intention and his future course of action. Furthermore, the arrest of top leaders of major 
political parties, including the serving prime minister, raised more doubt over the King’s 
motives. The Maoists were unsure of the King’s motives. After rigorous discussions 
among the Politburo Members and Central Committee Members during the Chunbang 
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meeting, the Maoist leadership decided to align with the political parties to oust the King 
from the power. The decision was followed by signing the 12-point agreement in Delhi, 
India, with Seven Party Alliances (SPA) in 2005. 
With this equation shift, the King had mathematically lost his battle even before 
entering the battlefield. The unified (Maoists and Seven Party Alliance) effort of 66.6% 
strength could outmaneuver the 33.3% strength (King) that lacked international support. 
The Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance opposed the King’s direct rule; he was forced 
to return power to the parliament in April 2006, which, in turn, reduced the King's status 
to that of a ceremonial monarch. He continued as such until 28 May 2008, when he was 
peacefully deposed, and Nepal became a federal republic.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Power shift after alliances among Maoist and Democratic political parties 
6. Prachanda As a Prime Minister and Out of the Government 
Prachanda’s credibility, fame, trust, and importance started their fall a few months 
after he went public. His first public appearances and his address to the Nepalese people 
were appreciated in the initial stage of his public life.  He was considered a person who 
was successful in convincing others to accept his agendas of insurgency (Roy, 2008). He 
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was able to convince other political parties, especially the Seven Party Alliance, to 
shoulder the Maoist agendas, to change Nepal into a republic, and to hold a Constituent 
Assembly to write a new constitution. 
It is claimed that Prachanda was successful in leading his insurgency to a peaceful 
settlement in which his party became the second-largest party in interim government—
and the largest after the constituent assembly elections. All the major demands for which 
they had initiated an insurgency were fulfilled—except their ultimate aim: “to achieve 
communism by waging Cultural Revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.” 
However, people and political leaders became uneasy when the Maoist party 
started acting without accepting other’s existence. Prachanda, declaring himself as the 
first President of the Democratic Republic of Nepal even before finalizing the date of 
election, gave an egotistic signal to the people and to other political parties. Prachanda 
sent a further message, which made the people fear a communist rule when he formed the 
Young Communist League (YCL) and authorized members, who were seen in the street 
of Kathmandu and other cities of the country, to engage in coercive activities. 
Although these actions might have given the Maoist cadres a sense of power in 
society, ultimately these actions damaged the images of the Maoist leadership, especially 
Prachanda. People were tired of intimidation, coercion, and extortion. These activities 
carried on even after the peace process had begun and the Maoists were considered to be 
a responsible political party.  
Politically, when the Maoists became the largest party in the Constituent 
Assembly, Prachanda became the prime minister of the country. On August 18, 2008, the 
first Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal—the Maoists’ 
Supremo Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda”—was sworn into office. His premiership, in 
brief, can be summed up as, “Although he was the head of a coalition government, his 
actions during his brief nine-month tenure were ones of a man who believed he had 
received a Marxist mandate from the entire country, which was clearly not the case. His 
inexperience as a governmental leader showed. A series of divisive missteps ensued” 
(Dunham, 2010). 
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Right from the first day of his premiership, Prachanda’s daringness took him toe-
to-toe with India. He broke the tradition of choosing India for his first foreign visit. 
Instead, he organized a visit to the Beijing Olympics and claimed that it was an apolitical 
decision. He said he was going to China to support his nation’s athletes.  
Prachanda was accused of attacking state institutions, such as the judiciary and 
media houses. The ministries started posting members of bureaus according to their will 
on the basis of political closeness and personal relations rather than abiding by the 
existing norms and laws (although similar practices had been exercised by other political 
parties in the past). 
Prachanda’s government attempted to have the Indian high priests removed from 
Nepal’s most sacred Hindu temple. Pashupatinath came under heavy criticism within 
Nepal and from India. Prachanda had underestimated the staying power of Hindu 
traditionalism, and highly charged street demonstrations forced Prachanda to back down 
from his unpopular decision (ICG, 2010). 
In the process of attacking national institutions, Prachanda miscalculated the 
strength of the army, which led to his resignation from the government. As Mikel 
Dunham argues,  
His greatest blunder was when he decided that he was securely positioned 
to oust Nepal’s Army Chief, General Rookmangud Katawal. It became a 
rallying point for most of the ruling parties. They lined up against 
Prachanda and, on May 4, 2009, Prachanda resigned. Overnight, the 
Maoist party switched from being the main player in the Constituent 
Assembly to the antagonists of the Constituent Assembly. (Dunham, 
2010)  
In addition, Prachanda lost the trust and confidence of national and international 
audiences by the release of his Shaktikhor video speech. In the tape, he had personally 
submitted a statement explaining how the Maoist had been smartly able to misguide the 
international community on the number of combatants. He further said in the video that 
they were able to raise the number from about five to seven thousand combatants to 
nearly thirty-two thousand. Even if one-half of them were disqualified, the remaining 
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number of the combatants would still be double their original strength. This video release 
was the issue that increased doubt on Prachanda’s motives, ethics, and trustworthiness 
(Dunham, 2010).  
The Maoists’ behavior in the parliament and outside did not serve them well—the 
critique of their actions made regular headlines in the national newspapers. Their 
continuing actions of murder, extortion, and intimidation were out in the public; 
moreover, their cosmetic apologies could not change the public sentiment. 
Continuous obstruction of parliaments, regular street protests in the name of civil 
supremacy, and demands for the Prime Minister’s resignation were adding to the negative 
sentiments against the Maoists. During one of the Maoists’ protests that aimed to 
paralyze the nation by calling an indefinite strike, the strike was countered head-on by the 
people. On the sixth day of the strike, tens of thousands of people from all walks of life 
poured onto the streets of Kathmandu, wearing blue or white shirts (to distinguish 
themselves from the red-shirted Maoists), demanding that the Maoists lift the strike. The 
crowd represented civil society members, businessmen, lawyers, doctors, engineers, 
professors, journalists, artists, and intellectuals. Courageously, they ignored the threats by 
the Maoists, and demanded that “enough was enough” (Dunham, 2010).  
The above-mentioned series of miscalculated actions irritated the public. The 
people were suspicious that the Maoists’ present actions were part of their struggle for 
power rather than a fight for the people’s welfare. This led to mistrust of the Maoist 
intentions; this indirectly damaged the overall trust and confidence in Prachanda. 
The outcomes of above-mentioned actions were clearly noticed during (the 
present) three failed Prime Minister’s elections. With the Maoists being the largest party 
in the Constituent Assembly, Prachanda has lost thrice in Prime Minister’s elections; 
moreover, there have been voices raised within the party and outside for a different party 
candidate than Prachanda—most likely Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. This sentiment against 
Prachanda, which rose to the level of looking for an alternative to him, can put a question 
mark on his leadership in open competitive politics, which requires a statesman armed 
with qualities other than a barrel of a gun. 
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7. Visit to China 
Traditionally, a first international visit of the Nepalese Prime Minister had been to 
India. India has been very influential and detrimental in the major political changes 
(1950, 1960, 1990, and 2006) in Nepal. Even the CPN (Maoist) were using Indian soil as 
a safe haven, and lots of support was coming from the public that supported the Maoist 
insurgency in Nepal (Roy, 2008). Moreover, the 12-Point Agreement was signed in Delhi 
with direct support from some of the members of the Indian political parties. It would 
have been difficult—rather, impossible—for the political parties to abolish the monarchy 
if the Indian two-pillar policy (monarchy and democracy are two stabilizing pillars of 
Nepalese politics) towards Nepal had not changed. At a later stage in the movement, 
India did not recognize the Monarchy as a stabilizing factor. This paved the way to 
indicate that the Monarch was isolated, even by India.  
Prachanda’s Olympic visit to China was taken negatively by India 1) because it 
broke the tradition to visit India first for the new Minister of Nepal, 2) because of India’s 
concern about closer relations between CPN (Maoist) and China; 3) and because India 
does not want increasing Chinese influence in its back yard. Moreover, India was the first 
country to invite Prachanda for an official visit. 
The Maoists decided not to cancel Prachanda’s Beijing trip despite an Indian 
invitation to visit India first. The suggestion that Prachanda should defer his trip to 
Beijing, along with an official invitation to visit India, was conveyed through Sharad 
Yadav (Kathmandu Post, Aug. 20, 2008). The Maoists decided not to cancel Prachanda’s 
Beijing trip. 
This incident was interpreted in diplomatic circles and in the media as a sign of 
Nepal’s pro-China tilt and as a challenge to New Delhi’s pre-eminence in the Himalayan 
country. This initiated a rift between Delhi and Prachanda which eventually proved 
damaging to Prachanda during the internal conflicts, especially when he decided to sack 
the Chief of the Army Staff Rookmangud Katawal. It backfired, and Prachanda had to 
resign from the government as his party lacked political support. 
 47
8. Decision to Remove the Chief of the Army Staff 
At a time when relations among the generals and the Maoist leadership were still 
good, Ram Bahadur Thapa, Prachanda’s politburo member, became the defense minister. 
During his eight months’ tenure in the Defense Ministry, no initiatives were taken to 
improve the relationship with the military. Thapa visited Army Headquarter only once.  
During his brief visit to Army Headquarters, no informal communication was 
noticed taking place between the generals and defense minister. Despite the Maoists 
leading the government, the long-term, deep-rooted rivalry between erstwhile enemies 
seemed still in play. The visit ended with a very formal briefing by the Chief of the Army 
Staff (COAS); moreover, no questions or inquiries were asked by any members of the 
government delegation to the Army Headquarters. 
The seed of rivalry among the leadership, especially between the defense minister 
and then–COAS General Rookmangud Katawal, was initiated when the Army was denied 
a new recruitment drive. The Defense Ministry’s written order to cease the recruiting 
process and the ministry’s decision not to extend the term of eight brigadier generals 
made the headlines in the national media, escalating an increased rift between the Army 
and its Defense Ministry. However, the Supreme Court decided in favor of eight 
brigadiers and extended the term. In these series of conflicting episodes, the Nepal 
Army’s withdrawal from the National Games in protest of the combatants’ participation 
added more fuel to the fire. 
The three cases—the Nepal Army’s refusal to halt a major recruitment drive, 
General Katawal’s instruction to eight brigadier generals to continue office despite the 
government’s decision not to extend their terms, and the Army’s withdrawal from the 
National Games in protest at the Maoist’s participation—pressured Prachanda to take 
actions against the COAS. (ICG, 2009, p. 3).  
The COAS was asked to submit written clarification of alleged acts of 




explanation. Prachanda made up his mind to sack the Chief of Army Staff, concluding 
that the COAS’s explanation was not convincing and was against the norms of the peace 
process. 
However, it turned out to be his greatest miscalculation when deciding he was 
securely enough positioned to oust Nepal’s army chief. It became a rallying point for 
most of the ruling parties. They lined up against Prachanda and, on May 4, 2009, 
convinced the president to overrule the PM’s decision to sack the COAS. Prachanda 
resigned. Overnight, the Maoist party switched from being the main player in the 
Constituent Assembly to the antagonists of the Constituent Assembly. General 
Rookmangud Katawal remained in office. “Many commentators blamed the Maoists for 
bringing down their own government through arrogant unilateralism” (ICG, 2009, p. 4). 
However, the lack of trust towards the Maoist leadership and concerns for 
stability were the cause of supporting General Katawal—more so than any great respect 
for him. As claimed in the International Crisis Group report (2009):  
But the real actor, as ever, was New Delhi….as India had been intimately 
involved in planning the downfall of the government. … Indian Foreign 
Minister Pranab Mukherjee played an important role, telephoning 
Jhalannath Khanal in China and advising him to return to Kathmandu and 
withdraw support to the Maoist. (ICG, 2009, p. 5) 
Interestingly, the newly appointed acting COAS, General Kul Bahadur Khadka 
(alleged to be close to the Maoist leadership), was retiring after nearly a month. If 
General Khadka did not make the COAS within this timeframe, he would retire 
automatically. The third person in line, General Chattraman Singh Gurung, would 
become the next chief. The only way General Khadka, if he had the motive and could 
manipulate the Maoist leadership, could become Army Chief was by sacking the present 
Army Chief and securing the appointment by political decision.  
International Crisis Group’s report (2009) claims: 
Khadka had clearly been in discussion with UCPN (M) over steps he 
could take to assist them. Many commentators allege he was willing to 
integrate all of the Maoists’ UN verified combatants and also to appoint 
 49
former PLA commanders to senior positions. Such claims may be true but 
while Khadka could have reduced NA (Nepal Army) opposition to Maoist 
policies, decisions on integration still rested with the multiparty Army 
Integration Special Committee (AISC) and officers posts were not in his 
gift. (p. 4) 
“What went wrong?” As ICG (2009) argues,  
First the Maoists underestimated the strength of resistance that Katawal 
and his backers would put up. Second, they stalled on taking action and 
gave their opponents enough time to outmaneuver them. Both mistakes 
suggest the skills that had served them well during the conflict have 
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IV. WHERE ARE THE MAOISTS NOW? 
McCormick (2007) argues, “It is frequently the inability to win that drives the two 
sides to the negotiating table and a compromised settlement” (p. 322). In the Nepalese 
case, initial negotiation did not take place between the government and the insurgents; 
but the insurgents, realized winning militarily was unlikely. Therefore, they forged an 
alliance with other democratic forces to negotiate and topple the King’s regime. 
Prachanda and his party were given the credit for opting for a negotiated peace settlement 
with other political parties. This alliance of Seven Political Parties and the Maoists was 
then able to force a deal with the King’s regime. 
Since signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the political and social 
changes in Nepal have been quite rapid and unprecedented, although the two ideological 
rivals—the Maoists and democratic parties—still disagree on the core subject of writing a 
constitution and on the kind of political system that the country is going to adopt.  
The main architect of this revolutionary change, the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist)—CPN (Maoist)—is said to have undergone ideological, strategic, and 
organizational transformations during this transitional period (Ogura, 2008). 
Theoretically, they have changed themselves from a party waging guerilla warfare to 
establish a communist state into a party that has participated in the Constituent Assembly 
election; they secured the largest number of Constitution Assembly members in the 
election.  
In terms of the organization’s size and electoral victory, the CPN (Maoist) in 
Nepal is the largest party in the Constituent Assembly. However, strategically CPN 
(Maoist) seems indecisive. They are unable to end the debate over whether the party 
should still struggle for proletarian dictatorship or accept a multiparty democratic system. 
It is still believed that the Maoists have used the political alliances with the other political 
parties as just a means to defeat the Monarch and that their end remains the same. There 
is an increasing distrust among the political parties about whether the Maoists are 
committed to democracy. International Crisis Group argues that the Maoists’ critics 
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suggest that they will never change: whatever promises the Maoists have made are only 
cosmetic, designed to sow confusion while they covertly pursue the same strategy of 
seizing power and establishing totalitarian rule (ICG, 2009, p. 7). 
As the leadership of the CPN (Maoist) tried to change according to the prevailing 
strategic environment of the country, there was a stiff resistance from the hardliner 
faction within the party (ICG, 2010). The fault lines between the key leaders, namely, 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda,” Dr Baburam Bhattarai, and Mohan Vaidya “Kiran,” 
were visible distinctly as the political discourse unfolded after the Jana Andolan II (Jha, 
2009). 
Initially, the Maoists waged a war against the incumbent government to establish 
a proletarian dictatorship in Nepal. However, realizing that military victory was 
impossible, the Maoists made a peace deal with the Seven Party Alliances and joined the 
mainstream politics of the country. It has been noticed that there was resistance and 
debate within the party over whether to give up arms and join the democratic forces in a 
democratic system against which they had waged the war.  
This action indicates that the faction seeking peaceful settlement won the debate 
at that particular time. Maoists concluded that a dictatorship winning militarily in Nepal 
was unlikely or they thought if they prolonged the armed struggle they were going to lose 
popular support. 
Whatever the reason may be, the Maoist decision to join mainstream politics by 
giving up arms was vastly welcomed by the people of the country. This decision can be 
one of the reasons to explain the Maoist victory in the Constituent Assembly elections. 
The people of Nepal were frustrated with insecurity; they wanted peace at any cost. 
However, presently internal ideological differences and external lack of trust in the 
Maoists by the Nepalese people and international stakeholders has put the CPN (Maoist) 
on the brink of a split, as well as of becoming a declining political power in the country. 
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A. POLITICALLY 
Politically, in terms of electoral victory in the Constituent Assembly election and 
number of active members in the party, the Maoists are the largest party in the country. 
Even though the CPN (Maoist) is the largest party in the Constituent Assembly, they 
have not been able to win the trust and the confidence of Nepalese people, other political 
parties, and international powers. Due to the above-mentioned reasons, they had to resign 
from the government and are not able to form a government under their leadership. 
Although they have signed various commitments and agreements to behave and act as a 
responsible political party, their actions, such as abduction, intimidation, capturing 
private properties, and killing of innocents, as well as their coercive actions to impose 
authority over the population, have contributed to their unpopularity. As Skar reports, “.. 
22 persons were killed and 772 people were abducted since the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement by the Maoist youth wing, the Young Communist League” (Skar, 2008, p.6). 
Being the largest elected political party in the Constituent Assembly (Maoist won 
120 seats out of 240 seats in the direct election of the CA), the Maoist-led government 
had to suddenly resign from the government as other coalition partners refused to support 
a decision to sack the army chief. The Maoist think that they should naturally lead the 
government as well as the peace process as they are the ones who brought about the 
radical political changes in the society, conducted 10 years of “people’s war” and 19 days 
of the popular movement against the Monarchy, and got the largest backing from the 
people in the country. 
After Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” stepped down, the Maoists started a 
program to protest against the decision of the President to reinstall the army chief. The 
Maoists called this an “unconstitutional” move of the President. The protest program 
culminated as the nationwide general strike and mass rallies were organized from 1 May 
2010. The general strike had to be called off a week after its launching by the Maoists as 
it started becoming counterproductive; people started attacking the Maoists physically, 
and large public rallies started coming out in the street against their protest.  
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At present within the Maoist party, there are two distinct schools of thought about 
how to go ahead politically. A faction, led by Mohan Vaidya “Kiran,” still advocates 
radically changing society and still believes in capturing the state power through forceful 
means. This group still advocates mass movement and city-based agitations to achieve its 
ends. The second faction, led by Baburam Bhattarai, who advocates for a logical and 
honorable conclusion of the peace process, seems to have a more liberal image within the 
party. This faction also wishes to participate actively in the constitution-making process 
and improve the Maoist party’s image internationally.  
An intense debate is taking place within the Maoist party between these two 
factions. The chairman, Prachanda, however, has been successful in remaining in the 
leadership position by playing one group against the other. As Jha argues, “Within the 
Maoists, Dr Bhattarai and his line prevailed but Prachanda continues to remain central to 
any deal-making” (Jha, 2010, p. 12). 
The divide between Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai was even more visible 
during the present PM election process. Prachanda did not want Baburam Bhattarai to be 
a candidate from his party for the prime minister’s post. Bhattarai’s group wanted the 
option for the prime minister’s candidate to be kept open with the hope that the other 
major political parties would agree to support Baburam in case he stood as the candidate 
for a prime minister. After the first round of contests, in which the Constituent Assembly 
was unable to elect a PM, Baburam gave an interview to the Kantipur Daily saying he is 
not power hungry, but if his candidacy could garner the support for consensus 
government, which he thinks is very much essential to take the peace process to its 
logical end and to make the constitution on time, he is ready. Baburam’s remark brought 
ripples in the Nepalese political circle, and Prachanda’s followers reacted very 
aggressively against his views. 
As the transitional period is delayed, the popular support for the Maoist party is 
waning day by day. When Prachanda went public and signed the Peace Accord in 
Baluwatar in 2006, his popularity was at its height. The performance of Prachanda’s 
nine-month government unmet expectations of the PLA combatants and the families of 
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the dead combatants, and the involvement of combatants and YCL in criminal activities, 
smuggling, and assassinations were all in contradiction to Prachanda’s words and deeds.  
While in the government, as Jha (2010) argues, the Maoists used the state to 
extend patronage and protection to their cadre, and make money as well as make 
symbolic gestures to show they would be different from the older parties. The use of the 
state to expand party influence grew after the Maoists took over the government in 
August 2008. These actions further deteriorated their popularity. 
The Maoists’ support base in Terai had shrunk after the emergence of Terai-based 
parties and the splitting off of Matrika Prasad Yadav’s group from the Maoist Party. In 
fact, most of the leaders who launched the Madhesi movement in the plains were ex-
Maoists; a similar trend is visible among the other ethnic groups. During this transitional 
period the popularity of the Maoists may be spiraling downwards (Jha, 2010). 
Maoists are desperately trying to establish themselves outside and inside the 
country as a responsible political party with respect for the rules of the game. However, 
their own internal differences and conflicts are getting so complicated even Prachanda is 
now being seriously challenged within his party. Also due to his dubious character, there 
is very little trust from other political parties and international stakeholders in him. 
Although they are the largest party in the Constituent Assembly, their coercive 
actions, lack of commitment in fulfilling signed commitments, and periodic rhetoric that 
they are in the path to capture state power have made the people and international powers 
distrust them. Furthermore, their internal conflicts among the top leaders have made the 
party weaker internally and externally. This indicates their lack of leadership in managing 
the party and external political environment in an open political context. 
Chairman Prachanda has been for the first time challenged by two of the party’s 
standing committee members. The recent differences among the top three leaders 
(Prachanda, Baburam, and Kiran) after presenting three separate conflicting papers at the 
Central Committee Meeting is a serious concern for the party’s unity and Prachanda’s 
leadership. It is noticed that all three leaders are going against the party direction not to 
gather cadres and giving orientation on certain documents issued by the standing 
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committee. They have been secretly massing their factions at different levels and trying 
to give orientation on their papers to garner support.  
If the Maoist party cannot prepare a common document from among these three 
documents, and voting takes place to choose a paper from among the three in the 
extended plenum, then the chances for the party to split are very high.  
If the Maoist leadership had behaved and acted according to their commitments to 
build a corruption-free Nepal and had gotten rid of nepotism and the parochial system, 
then they could have harnessed an opportunity to gain and build the trust of the people. A 
lack of specific policy plans, or lack of statesmanship in an open political environment, 
has degraded the party as well as made the party unpopular. While in the government, 
similar to other political parties of the past, the Maoists failed to fulfill the aspirations of 
the people. They abused the state resources to expand their party while in the 
government, which could be clearly seen by the people (Jha, 2010). These 
aforementioned weaknesses and internal conflicts have seriously weakened the Maoist 
party politically to a point where their previous political position would be very difficult 
or be unlikely to be regained. 
B. STRATEGICALLY 
Strategically the Maoists were very successful during the insurgency as well as at 
the initial stages of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, the 
more they became open to democratic political environments and got exposed to external 
dealings, the more their status declined. They made many commitments and agreements 
which hardly got fulfilled. Their promises and actions were contradictory; many national 
and international stakeholders were suspicious. Their strategic moves and actions 
seriously backfired on them to a point that, if not withdrawn, they would face serious 
consequences from the same public that had “supported” them during the people’s 
movement.  
The biggest question is whether the Maoists have genuinely embarked on the path 
of peaceful politics. Their critics suggest that they will never change: whatever promises 
 57
they have made are only cosmetic, designed to sow confusion while they covertly pursue 
the same strategy of establishing totalitarian rule in its place (ICG, 2009, p. 7). 
Their motive of capturing power through force has been continuously practiced 
since the beginning of the agreement to present day. These raises the questions: Can the 
Maoists do politics without their coercive apparatus and is the Nepali Times right when it 
states: “The right of Maoists to hold on to their coercive apparatus must be enshrined in 
any new constitution if we want to have a true democracy” (Nepali Times, 2010, p. 512). 
Their true motive has confused the public more because of the organizational structure 
and because of YCL, which is militarily organized from the central to village level.  
After the Kharipati meeting in 2008, the CPN (M) had two clear divisions in the 
political thoughts in the party: The hardliner leader Kiran presented a document that 
claimed that a suitable time had come for popular uprising and setting up a people's 
republic. The hardliner leader’s view was contrary to Chairman Prachanda’s, who 
produced a document stating that the party should move ahead with creating a new statute 
in favor of Democratic Party politics. The hardliners blamed the current Maoists’ 
leadership for betraying the spirit of the people's war and being more into luxury after 
holding power and also for sidelining the revolutionary leaders from important positions 
of the party and filling those positions up with those who support his steps. 
Currently, the two factions supporting Dr. Bhattarai and Vaidya have more or less 
come to a point of understanding against their current chairman, which could be seen in 
the recent Central Committee meetings, where the chairman had to face a tough challenge 
regarding the current political strategy and nomination of the PM candidate. “Dahal will 
try to block Baburam Bhattarai, even if it means sitting in the opposition again. But the 
balance of power in the party has shifted to Bhattarai and today he is in a stronger 
position than he was six months ago” (Jha, 2010). 
For the Maoists, the current interim period is a transitional phase to destroy the 
“old mechanism” and build a new state structure through the CA constitution-making 
process (ICG, 2007). If this succeeds, they will declare the “peaceful revolution” a  
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victory for their new strategy. If the process is derailed, they will try to lead a more 
traditional “revolution” in the form of a mass insurrection, but not the return to full-scale 
insurgency (ICG,  2007).  
The Maoist’s present anti-Indian rhetoric has been taken very seriously by New 
Delhi. Furthermore, India is concerned about the issue of a recent tape scandal that 
showed Mahara, who heads the foreign section of the party, talking to a Chinese 
nationalist and explaining a requirement of 500 million rupees (about US$ 7 million) to 
form a new Maoist government and to neutralize the south. On top of that, the visit of a 
high-level delegation to Nepal immediately after the telephone scandal may have 
signaled India about China’s concern in Nepal.  
Considering the Maoists’ present position nationally and internationally, it can be 
argued that due to their strategic failures to convince the people, the political parties, and 
the international stakeholders of their true motives, the Maoists are strategically 
sidelined. Prachanda is having difficulties managing the internal games and balancing the 
external ones, which in turn is weakening the organization internally and externally.  
C. STRUCTURALLY 
After their decision to give up armed struggle, following the successful April 
2006 movement, the Maoists went through structural changes in the party organizations, 
among the combatants, and in the People’s government (Ogura, 2008). Before Jana 
Andolan II, the Maoist organization was focused to support the rural-based People’s War 
they had been waging. After the ending of the People’s War, they carried out structural 
changes to suite the “peaceful development of the revolution.” To suit their changed 
strategy, they become more focused on urban centers (Ogura, 2008). Major structural 
changes carried out during this transitional phase are: 1) they dissolved the People’s 
government, as demanded by the major political parties and the international 
communities; 2) they have kept their PLA combatants in the UN–designated 
Cantonments as per the CPA; 3) many PLA political commissars were transferred from 
the military apparatus to the party organization (Skar, 2008); 4) they have expanded and 
strengthened the YCL, which has become the coercive tool of the Maoists and is more or 
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less structured like their combat organization (Skar, 2008); 5) after the merger with CPN 
(Unity Centre), Maoists have expanded their Standing Committee to 16 members, 
Politburo to 46 members, and Central Committee to 139 members to accommodate the 
leaders from Unity Centre. 
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The Nepalese Maoist Insurgency under Prachanda’s leadership, without strong 
visible external support and without achieving a military victory over the state, rose 
extensively in a very short time. It is Prachanda’s ability (as a political entrepreneur) to 
balance the “inside games” and “outside games” to maneuver through oppositions and 
constraints that yielded the Maoist insurgency rise to power in Nepal. However, 
Prachanda failed to demonstrate a similar kind of leadership ability once his party formed 
a government. His leadership became less popular in an open democratic political 
environment, and failed to address a variety of issues that required the trust of the people 
and the confidence of other political parties in the Maoists actions. 
This study does not particularly focus on the reasons of the Maoists’ failure to 
remain in power after securing political victory in the Constitution Assembly election and 
even after forming a government under its leadership. However, it opens a door to 
interested scholars to investigate the reasons for its failure even after securing a political 
victory and forming a government under its leadership. The CPN (Maoist) failed to 
remain in power as well as was unable to deliver the promises that it had made during the 
insurgency; furthermore, it abused the state resources, in similar ways as previous 
political parties, to expand its bases in the areas where its influence was less and to 
recruit its cadres into different government and non-government institutions. 
To prepare to rebel, Prachanda had made an in-depth evaluation of the overall 
conditions of the country as well as advantages and disadvantages of the Maoists’ 
launching an insurgency. He had also categorically differentiated the social groups that 
were easy and those difficult to motivate. The strengths and weaknesses of the 
government and their party were also analyzed and considered in advance. By evaluating 
the overall political, geographical, and social environment of the country, the leadership 
concluded: 1) the geographical situation is the most favorable for waging guerilla war 
with a direct link with the people; 2) Nepalese armed struggle cannot take the form of a 
direct or positional warfare against the enemy at the beginning; 3) initiate and develop 
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guerilla wars in different parts of the country by taking peasant revolution as the back 
bone; 4) people’s support will increase if the tactics are pursued carefully; and 5) 
mobilize the people abroad, especially in India, for logistical purposes. 
In the process internal disputes and external constraints were sure to exist. 
However, there seemed very few issues that came out of the party’s control. This 
suggests that Prachanda was able to manage these internal games effeciently without 
letting them grow out of proportion. The internal differences within the party were 
managed very successfully by Prachanda during the insurgency. The most serious issue 
that concerned the party leadership and attracted outside attention was in Chunbang in 
2005, which eventually ended with a compromise between Prachanda and Dr. Baburam 
Bhattarai.  
Prachanda’s leadership qualities facilitated the Maoists’ growth in Nepal. They 
gained political success without military victory and eventually won an electoral victory 
in the Constituent Assembly. Internally, Prachanda was able to wage a war against a 
democracy that was witnessing a positive economic growth, and he was successful in 
bringing an electoral victory to his party. However, in an open democratic political 
environment Prachanda is challenged internally as well as externally. Even having the 
largest party in the Constituent Assembly, he was not able to convince other political 
parties to accept his leadership. This shows that Prachanda was successful in waging an 
insurgency in an environment that was conducive to rebellion, and he outmaneuvered 
most of the stakeholders who countered him; however, he seems less prepared to compete 
in an open democratic environment that seeks leadership qualities other than those 
needed for rebellion. 
The Maoists created an environment of distrust of the Maoists’ intentions by 
attacking media houses, religious institutions, and security organizations. The attacks, 
which were against the interests of peace mediation parties, took place while the Maoists 
were in a coalition government but without approval of their coalition partners.  
The internal difference among the leadership within the Maoist party, over what 
kind of policy the party should adopt in this particular stage of revolution, is still very 
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much under discussion. There are serious discussions being held on this issue, and the 
party is at the moment divided into two factions. Furthermore, the Maoist party’s lack of 
commitment to their past agreements has generated lack of trust among the people and 
among political parties. These events forced Prachanda to resign from the government.  
The Nepalese insurgency shows that a leadership is one of the most important 
factors that guide an insurgency to its successful destiny. Prachanda’s understanding of 
prevailing political, social, and cultural grievances of the country encouraged him to 
organize a rebel party, and he manipulated an existing environment favorable to rebellion. 
The leadership of the communist party planned its future actions in detail and 
implemented them with a workable plan and a correct strategy. The leadership was 
flexible enough to switch its strategy from classic communist ideology of class struggle 
to identity issues when it was deemed necessary.  
The Maoists were shrewd enough to play on contradictions. They played one rival 
against another by aligning with one side for their own benefit. When military victory 
was deemed unlikely in the current world context, their timely switching to political 
settlements demonstrated a correct step that led the Maoist insurgency to a political 
victory in Nepal.  
However, the same leadership of Prachanda that was able to facilitate the 
insurgency to grow from a mere 70-odd active workers in 1996 to the largest political 
party in 2008 is facing a dilemma over the political course that the party should adopt as 
well as failing to garner support and trust from within and without. A question arises: 
Will a rebel leadership that was successful during an insurgency fail to lead and garner 
support in an open democratic system that seeks compromises and adherence to 
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